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What happens when a previously uncovered labor market is regulated? We exploit the
introduction of a minimum wage in South Africa and variation in the intensity of this law to
identify increases in wages and formal contract coverage, and no signicant e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on the intensive or extensive margins for domestic workers. These large, partial responses to the
law are somewhat surprising, given the lack of monitoring and enforcement in this informal sector.
We interpret these changes as evidence that external sanctions are not necessary for new labor
legislation to have a signi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11 Introduction
What happens to wages and employment in the informal sector after the introduction of a
minimum wage in that sector? The vast minimum wage literature in economics has remarkably
little to say on this question, since the informal sector has more often represented the uncovered
sector in this research and has been used to help distinguish between models of the labor market.
For example, if the wage and employment eects of a formal sector minimum are mirrored by
opposite-signed responses in the informal sector, this is consistent with a segmented two-sector
labor market model.1 However, if informal sector wages increase (and employment decreases)
when a formal sector minimum is adjusted upwards, this is consistent with spillovers in an
integrated labor market, or possibly with \lighthouse eects".2 In this paper, we extend the
minimum wage literature and investigate whether a minimum wage oor can have any eect when
directly applied to the informal sector, where the institutional environment for monitoring and
enforcement of penalties is weak. We use the introduction of the rst minimum wage in South
Africa's domestic worker sector in November 2002 to analyze what can happen in the short-run.
Whether a minimum wage can have any impact in the informal sector is broadly relevant
for understanding more about the process of labor market formalization in developing countries.
As economies develop, labor relationships shift from rural to urban areas and take place in larger
and larger rms; employees or their employers start to pay taxes and workers gain legal
protections, often including a guaranteed minimum rate of pay. Such protections, when enforced,
may improve working conditions and reduce poverty among the least skilled workers (Lustig and
McLeod (1997) summarize results from several studies), or may hinder the operation of markets
and negatively aect productivity (as in Besley and Burgess, 2004) and employment.3 For many
1See Brown (1988) for a discussion of two sector models in minimum wage studies.
2Spillover eects into the informal sector or other formal uncovered sectors have been documented by many
researchers, particularly in Latin American countries. See Lemos (2009) for Brazil, Gindling and Terrell (2004) for
Costa Rica, Maloney and Menendez (2004) for a variety of Latin American countries, Bell (1997) for Mexico and
Colombia. See also Cortes (2004) for the USA. Brown (1988) notes that in the US, a large fraction of workers earn
the minimum wage, even though they are employed by establishments not subject to the minimum wage law.
3In that paper, Besley and Burgess (2004) show how active and costly pro-worker regulation in the formal
manufacturing sector in India led to increased informality, reduced investment and lower labor productivity.
2developing countries contemplating such regulation, resources for monitoring and enforcement are
limited. Most economic models of employer behavior require some penalty and a non-zero
probability of being audited to predict any eects of minimum wage regulations (see Ashenfelter
and Smith (1979) for the canonical model of minimum wage compliance).4 A rst-order question
for many developing countries then is: what eects can be expected from new labor legislation
that is not monitored or enforced?
In this paper, we shed light on the eects of new labor regulation in a context without
active enforcement or clear penalties. We present an empirical example in which domestic work
employers face an extremely high minimum wage (set at the 70th percentile of the pre-law wage
distribution) with no eective penalties and no monitoring, and show that employers still choose
to respond to the law. We document immediate, large and partial adjustment of wages upwards in
the wake of the law and nd no signicant eects on the intensive or extensive margins of work, at
least in the short-run, 16 months after the law is introduced.5 We also show dramatic increases in
the fraction of domestic workers who have a formal contract of employment, after the law. This
South African case indicates that labor legislation may not require a degree of market formality in
order to be eective; rather, the introduction of the law may serve as a focal point for shifting
markets in the direction of becoming more formal.6
The domestic work sector is important in its own right, and is under-studied given its
4Despite the greater availability of resources for enforcement in developed countries, non-compliance with mini-
mum wage laws is widespread. Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) note that compliance with the US Federal minimum
wage was only 65% in 1973; Cortes (2004) reports that in 1997, as many as 40% of US workers who qualied were
paid less than the minimum wage; and non-compliance rates in excess of 50% have been reported for Mexico, Mo-
rocco (Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput 1997) and other developing countries. See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a
comprehensive review of the literature on minimum wages from developing countries. All of the theoretical literature
on compliance with a minimum wage hinges on employers choosing an optimal level of compliance in the face of
penalties and enforcement. See Grenier (1982), Chang and Ehrlich (1985), Bloom and Grenier (1986), Chang (1992),
Lott and Robert (1995) and Weil (2005).
5One benet of focussing on short-run eects is that there is little time for workers to sort across areas and relocate
e.g. from rural to urban areas in search of higher wage jobs. In our data, roughly the same fraction of domestic
workers report starting their current job in the past year, both before and after the law (12% in September 2001 and
14% in September 2003). The remainder had longer tenure. Unfortunately, we are unable to analyze tenure length
in this paper, as this information was not collected in every year of the survey.
6The rst minimum wage law introduced in the US in 1912 (in Massachussetts, for women) had some similar
features to our setting. One penalty involved newspapers \naming and shaming" non-compliant rms by publishing
their names (Thiess, 1991).
3prevalence over space and time. Historically, this sector has been important in developed
countries. Rubinow (1906) uses census data to show that over 1.2 million women were employed
in domestic work in the US in 1900. World-wide, the market for domestic workers currently
employs many millions of women: foreign workers employed in private households currently make
up around 10% of the labor force in a number of Middle Eastern countries (Kremer and Watt,
2006); Cortes and Pan (2009) document that foreign domestic workers constitute 6% of the
workforce in Hong Kong; while ILO data for OECD countries record an average of 100,000 female
domestic workers per country. The UK and Germany are at the high end of this range with
400,000 and 460,000 female domestic workers respectively. In South Africa, close to one in ve
women{ about one million women{ work as domestic workers.
In most of these labor markets, the domestic work sector clearly ts the ILO's denition
of `informal', as it consists of one-employee enterprizes (households) in which labor relations are
predominantly uncontracted and without formal minimum wage or other protections. The small
scale of employers makes this sector costly for unions to organize.7 Work often extends beyond
simple housekeeping services and can require a great deal of trust, particularly when child-care is
involved or when the employer is absent during working hours. Additionally, and particularly in
Asia, Latin America and the USA, domestic workers are often foreign migrant workers with
tenuous legal status. This increases their vulnerability in the labor market.8 For example, in the
USA, domestic workers are largely undocumented and are not yet guaranteed all of the
protections of the National Labor Standards Act (e.g. they are not currently entitled to overtime
pay).9 We believe our analysis of the South African case sheds light on the short-run eects of
7The ILO denes \informal employment" as \all remunerative work (i.e. both self-employment and wage em-
ployment), that is not registered, regulated or protected by existing legal or regulatory frameworks, as well as non-
remunerative work undertaken in an income-producing enterprize. Informal workers do not have secure employment
contracts, worker's benets, social protection or workers' representation" (http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ILO-
Thesaurus/english/tr1746.htm).
8This idea of heightened vulnerability is not new. In 1906, Rubinow (1906) writes about the \servant girl's
problem" and describes American preferences for hiring foreign women for domestic work as being related to the
\greater ease of managing them", which translates into \longer hours, perhaps lowers wages, more work and, in
general, conditions of service more favorable to the employer".
9Recently, the state of New York became the rst state in the USA to sign into law a Domestic Work-
ers Bill of Rights. Among other rights, the new law ensures that domestic workers have notice of termina-
4introducing minimum wage legislation to these informal and uncovered work relationships that are
globally prevalent.
The empirical exercise in this paper is straightforward. We evaluate the eects of South
Africa's 2002 minimum wage law for domestic workers by exploiting time-series variation in the
application of the law and pre-existing cross-sectional variation related to the intensity of the law
to identify wage and employment eects. We use six waves of a biannual labor force survey (LFS)
from 2001 to 2004 to capture worker-reported wages, hours of work and employment over time at
relatively high frequency. Large shifts in the wage and earnings distributions of domestic workers
are evident in non-parametric kernel densities. We complement this with an analysis that adopts
the methods in Lee (1999).10 We combine the before-after variation in the law with cross-sectional
variation in the intensity of the minimum wage law to implement a dierence-in-dierences
strategy to statistically examine the eects of the law. Using just the before-after variation, the
analysis shows that domestic worker wages increase by about 20% in the 16 months after the law.
Comparing the change in wages (and hours of work) of domestic workers in places where the
median wage was far below the wage oor in the pre-period, to places where the median wage was
closer to the minimum, we nd that wages increased by a signicant and additional 10-15%,
post-law. In contrast, we nd no signicant reduction in hours of work (although measurement
error in this variable makes it dicult to precisely estimate any hours eects), nor any signicant
change in the probability of a low-skilled female worker being employed as a domestic worker in
the pre- versus post-period, in high wage gap compared to lower wage gap areas.11
In the typical dierence-in-dierences research design that exploits a change in policy at
tion, receive paid sick days and holidays, and other basic labor protections that are standard in the Fair La-
bor Standards Act. See the editorial \The Rights of Domestic Workers", The New York Times June 15, 2009.
httP : ==www:nytimes:com=2009=06=15=opinion=15mon3:html Also the article \Senate Passes Historic Bill To Pro-
tect Domestic Workers" at http : ==www:nysenate:gov=press release=senate passes historic bill protect 
domestic   workers posted on June 2, 2010.
10In that paper, Lee (1999) uses regional dierences in the relative level of the US federal minimum wage to identify
the eects of the minimum wage law on wage inequality in the 1980s, separately from the eects of national trends
in wages.
11While there are changes in the observable characteristics of domestic workers after the law, adjusting for this
compositional change does not account for the entire shift in the distribution of domestic worker wages in the wake
of the law. We show this in an appendix.
5one point in time, a key identication assumption is that both the exposed and unexposed groups
are on the same trend in the absence of the policy change. In our scenario, all areas are exposed
to the law, but we make use of the fact that this law is more demanding of employers in areas
with lower pre-law wages. However, since the minimum wage is set so high in the pre-law wage
distribution, we expect to see (and do nd) that domestic workers in all areas experience higher
wages in the immediate months after the law. Unlike other dierence-in-dierences approaches to
minimum wage policy changes, we are interested in the simple pre-post \dierence" in wages as a
potential outcome of the new law. To provide evidence that the generalized wage increases we nd
for all domestic workers is not solely the result of economy-wide shocks, we perform one placebo
experiment. We estimate the dierence-in-dierences specication for a set of similar workers who
are unlikely to compete over jobs with domestic workers, but whose job conditions likely reect
general economic conditions: low-skilled male manufacturing workers in urban areas. We nd that
in the period after the law, male manufacturing wages increase by about 10%, suggesting some
improvement in the economy after 2002. However, we can reject that these pre-post changes for
manufacturing workers are the same as for domestic workers: domestic workers as a group still
experience a signicantly larger gain in wages (10%) in the period after the law. Furthermore, we
nd no evidence that wages for male manufacturing workers rise more in areas where the
minimum wage law was more binding on domestic workers. This gives us more condence that the
dierence-in-dierences results we estimate for domestic workers are not being driven by
dierential wage trends between high and low wage gap areas.
One limitation of our analysis is that the data do not allow us to rule out that employers
achieved these wage increases by making osetting reductions in non-wage in-kind benets. These
benets, mainly in the form of free food, were fairly substantial for some workers before the law,
as we describe. In order to show that the new law did have a substantive impact on the conditions
of work for domestic workers (outside of any wage increases), we also examine the probability that
a domestic worker has a formal job contract with their employer, after the law. We nd that the
probability of an employee having a formal contract doubles in the 16 months after the law,
6regardless of the intensity of the minimum wage oor in their area of work. This evidence on
contract coverage reects the beginning of the formalization of this industry, which could have
far-reaching consequences for the nature of domestic work in the country.
Given the weak institutional environment for enforcement of the law, which we describe,
it is somewhat surprising that we see such large wage responses and no employment eects in this
informal sector. Isolating the exact reasons for the employer response is not easy; however, we
propose two pieces of evidence that suggest that employers were voluntarily and only partially
responding to the law. First, we develop a test for partial compliance, which shows that some
workers get increases bringing their wages closer to, but not nearly up to, compliant levels. This
partial compliance probably contributes to the lack of employment eects of the law.12 Second, we
show that the wage response of employers is not signicantly dierent across places with dierent
audit probabilities, where we use the presence of a local Labour Centre (LC) as a proxy measure
of this probability. Partial compliance that does not appear responsive to the likelihood of audit is
consistent with the idea that employers may not have been primarily motivated by threat of
external sanctions.
Two related and unpublished papers have examined the eect of the minimum wage law
for domestic workers in South Africa: Hertz (2006) and Yamada (2007). Our study diers from
these studies in several dimensions. First, we focus on urban workers only, because we believe that
identication of the impact of the new minimum wage law for rural domestic workers is likely
confounded by the concomitant introduction of a minimum wage for agricultural workers, a
plausible alternative sector for low-skilled workers in rural areas.13 Second, we use an updated and
consistent set of survey weights for the LFS data (Branson, 2009) which were not available for
these studies.14 Third, we use a higher level of aggregation (the province) to dene areas in which
12This nding relates to a theoretical point made in a recent paper by Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2007). The
authors develop a model in which governments accept some non-compliance with minimum wage legislation to
achieve distributional goals.
13Agricultural workers received protection under a minimum wage law, also for the rst time, 6 months after the
domestic worker minimum wage oor was imposed.
14Details of this choice are discussed in the data section.
7the new law was more or less binding, based on pre-law characteristics. This choice presents other
challenges for inference, which we describe in detail in our empirical approach section.15 Our
results for the wage eects of the minimum wage law turn out to be quite a bit smaller than the
estimates in Hertz (2006) and Yamada (2007) and, unlike these studies, we nd very little evidence
for a negative employment eect of the law on either the intensive or extensive margins of work.
The paper begins with a description of the domestic worker industry in South Africa
before the law and describes the characteristics of the new law introduced in 2002. After
describing the data and presenting summary statistics of our sample, we turn to documenting the
wage, earnings, employment and hours of work eects of the law using a combination of kernel
densities for wages and earnings and dierence-in-dierences regressions. We discuss our test for
and present evidence of partial compliance with the law. We show that wage increases are not
larger in places with higher probability of audit, and that the law increased the probability of a
domestic worker having a formal employment contract, regardless of how large the initial wage
gap in the province of residence was. We conclude with a discussion and interpretation of results.
2 The domestic worker industry in South Africa
The domestic worker industry in South Africa employs 18% of all women, and 80% of all domestic
workers are female. Poorly educated African and coloured women make up the vast majority of
these domestic workers.16 In each year of our study, about 15% of urban African and coloured
female workers were in the domestic work sector. Unlike many Latin American and Middle
Eastern settings, and more like countries in the rest of Africa and parts of India, the majority of
15Hertz's 2006 working paper uses some of the same LFS cross-sectional data to estimate the impact of the law on
wages and employment using a dierence-in-dierences approach that relies on a much smaller unit of analysis (the
magisterial district). He relates the intensity of the minimum wage law to the fraction of workers in a magisterial
district who initially earned below the minimum (following Card and Krueger, 1997). We choose not to use magisterial
districts as the unit of analysis, since many districts contain only a few (under 10) individuals in each wave who are
employed as domestic workers.
16Following much of the economic literature on South Africa, we use apartheid-era racial classications: African
for Black South African, and coloured for individuals of mixed race.
8domestic workers in South Africa are not foreigners. Table 1 presents means and standard
deviations of female domestic worker demographics for each survey period before the law is
enacted (September 2001, March 2002), the \cusp" survey wave of September 2002, and the three
surveys after the law (March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004). All statistics are weighted,
and the data sources are described in more detail in the next section.
Immediately obvious from Table 1 is the remarkable stability of worker characteristics in
this industry. About 60% of domestic workers are urban workers, and within the urban group {
our sample of interest { the average age of workers is around 40. The majority are African and
have between 6.3 and 7.1 years of education (completed primary school). This is 0.8 to 2 years
below the average education of women working in the most closely related skill-groups: women in
elementary occupations (e.g. newspaper vendors, oce cleaners, hawkers, building caretakers,
garbage collectors etc) and the female self-employed. 76% or more of domestic workers report
working full-time, dened as 28 hours or more per week, making the majority subject to the
full-time minimum wage.
Domestic workers are poorly remunerated. Mean wages are lower in this occupational
group than in any other: the ratio of the mean domestic worker wage to the mean wage for other
low-skilled African and coloured elementary workers (self-employed women) was 0.49 (0.64) in
September 2001. Prior to November 2002, there was no minimum wage in the domestic worker
sector and no formal mechanism existed for domestic workers to negotiate wages. Wages were
typically set unilaterally by the employer household or in consultation with other local employers
(see Cock (1989) for a qualitative description of this process). Some aspects of the 1997 South
African Basic Conditions of Employment Act governed overtime provisions, leave considerations,
minimum notice periods, fair dismissal procedures and severance pay for all workers (Department
of Labour, 1997). However, these were rarely adhered to in this informal market (Louw and Van
der Berg, 2004). Only 10% of domestic workers had a formal contract of employment in 2001,
compared to 55% of elementary occupation workers.
9Remuneration for domestic work often combines cash and in-kind benets. In another
survey (the 2000 South African Income and Expenditure survey, results not shown) which
captures information from employers about the value of food, clothing, accommodation and
unemployment benets provided to the worker, about 25% of domestic worker employers report
providing the employee with some housing; 3% report unemployment insurance (UI) benets, 34%
report some clothing provided to the employee, and the vast majority of employers, 80%, report
providing free food to employees. Averaging over all domestic worker households, we nd that the
fraction of total remuneration accounted for by these benets is low for UI (0.6%), clothing (6%)
and housing (5%), and highest for food (20%).17 Since a large fraction of total remuneration
comes from in-kind benets before the law, it is plausible that employers may adjust benets
downward to aord the wage increases. This will be an important caveat to the interpretation of
our wage results.
In setting the rst national minimum wage for domestic workers, the Department of
Labour (DoL) took into account the recommendations of a government-appointed Employment
Conditions Commission. This group of government representatives and academics dened the
scope of the Domestic Worker Sector and concluded that any wage oor should \improve the
livelihoods of those worst o" and \retain jobs". Their recommendation for the actual minimum
wage level was higher than that initially proposed by the government, and was the one eventually
adopted (Budlender et al, 2002).
Under the new law, which became eective on 1 November 2002, domestic workers and
gardeners working in private homes had the right to a minimum wage and to 8% annual wage
increases.18 The urban full-time hourly minimum wage was set at ZAR4.10 (USD 0.410) in
November 2002; the part-time wage was ZAR4.51 (USD 0.451) where part-time work is dened as
17We get these fractions by dividing the employer-reported value of food, accommodation, clothing and UI provided
per month by the total monthly remuneration (cash plus benets) reported by the employer. The more recent IES
in 2005/2006 does not contain these data and so we cannot compare how these in-kind benets may have changed
over time.
18Garden workers, most of whom are men, are also covered as domestic workers under this law. However, they
make up a minority of domestic workers and so we omit them from our analysis.
10fewer than 28 hours per week. In addition, the new law enabled employers to deduct up to 10% of
the total salary for rental value of any accommodation provided. A separate and related piece of
legislation, introduced shortly afterwards on April 1, 2003, additionally required employers to
register domestic workers with the DoL in order to pay unemployment insurance (UI).19
It is important to note that the changes introduced in this industry are an order of
magnitude larger than typical changes in the value of the minimum that economists typically
study: the wage oor was set at 1.5 times the median monthly earnings of domestic workers in
2002. Full compliance in this context would have entailed massive wage increases for a majority of
workers and potentially large employment eects for most employees either on the extensive or
intensive margin. Given existing high levels of unemployment in South Africa, this would be one
possible reason for why the government did not commit substantial resources towards enforcement
of the law.
In fact, in the rst ten months after the law, both the audit probability and penalty for
rst time violators were very small.20 As far as we have been able to establish, no inspections were
carried out until August 2003, ten months after the law. At this time, 1,600 households in ve
provinces were earmarked for inspection and 25% of them were found to be in compliance with the
law.21 We have not been able to obtain further statistics on household inspections from the DoL.
There were also no documented rules about penalties or back-pay for non-compliers at the
time of implementation. Press releases from the DoL in February 2003 indicated that
\Non-compliance with the UI law will result in penalties of up to ZAR5,000 (USD500) per
19The average Rand/USD exchange rate from June 2002-January 2003 of ZAR10=USD1.
20During this time, employers might have expected a vanishingly small audit probability for two reasons. First,
the chances of random inspection are small since inspections are labor intensive and each household yields only a
single worker inspection. If each domestic worker works in only one household, this yields over one million employers
that are subject to the minimum wage law. Second, logistical diculties in gaining access to employer premises make
any inspection costly. A non-compliant employer can legally refuse to allow an inspector into their private residence,
or simply not be present at the time of the inspection. A court order from a Labor Court is then required to enter
the residence. There are also physical barriers to entry: inspectors have reported diculties with impenetrable gates
and \the presence of dogs" (Ocial release by the DoL, 27th August 2003. Available at www:labour:gov:za).
21See media release at www:labour:gov:za=media=statement:jsp?statementdisplayid = 9685
11household or ve years imprisonment"22. However, we have not been able to nd formal
documentation of this or other penalties, nor has our search of newspaper archives revealed any
reports of nes or prison sentences being imposed on non-compliant employers.23 What we do
know is that non-compliers might have expected three progressively more threatening warnings
(telephonic, written, court order) before appearing at a court of law. At this time, they would
have had a right of appeal, which would be well exercised as it is unclear how evidence for
non-compliance would be substantiated in this predominantly cash payment industry.24
All evidence from the DoL website and various legal documents and reports related to the
law suggest that the general monitoring and enforcement regime in the domestic worker industry
was weak and presented employers with an almost zero expected cost of non-compliance. Despite
this lack of compliance incentive, the timing of the law coincides with substantial rightward shifts
in the wage and earnings distributions of domestic workers. We document this after describing our
data.
3 Data description and empirical methods
3.1 LFS Surveys
We use six cross sections of data from the nationally representative South African Labour Force
Surveys (LFS): September 2001, March 2002, September 2002, March 2003, September 2003 and
March 2004. These LFS surveys are biannual rotating panel surveys, conducted in
February/March and September each year and include detailed data on work and unemployment
experiences of 60,000 to 70,000 working-age individuals living in 30,000 households. The six waves
22http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2003/03050809461001.htm
23The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997) which covers all formal sector workers states that underpayment
violations are penalized in the following manner: rst oence - 25% of the gap plus interest; second oence within 3
years - 50% of the gap plus interest; third oence within 3 years or second oence within 2 years - 75% of the gap
plus interest; fourth oence within 3 years - 100% of the gap plus interest; fth oence within 3 years - 200% of the
gap plus interest.
24Pay slips are now required as part of the minimum wage legislation.
12we use span the period just before and just after the minimum wage law becomes eective in
November 2002. The survey instrument is similar to the US Current Population Survey, although
the rotation pattern diers. In each wave, 20% of households interviewed in the previous wave are
rotated out of the survey entirely.25 These LFS data are high frequency and can be used to
examine dierences over a six month window. They help us to estimate the immediate impacts of
the law while controlling for observable characteristics of domestic workers (i.e. age, race and
years of education) and to see whether pre- versus post comparisons are sensitive to these controls.
We also model the probability of being employed as a domestic worker in each wave, using the set
of employed and unemployed women with similar age and education proles to domestic workers.
We use these LFS data as repeated cross sections and exploit the cross-sectional variation in
intensity of the law at the province level (9 provinces in total) in combination with the time-series
variation in the law's intensity to identify the eects of the law. 26
3.2 Sample weights
One further aspect of the data that is worth noting concerns the appropriateness of the sample
weights available in the LFS. Survey weights for LFS 2001 and 2002 are benchmarked to the 1996
Census; while survey weights for LFS 2003 are benchmarked to the later 2001 Census. With
dierent benchmark years, this series of weights is potentially inconsistent over time. Hertz (2006)
provides a detailed discussion of how these inconsistencies in the weights may aect any analysis
25Although there are three earlier waves of data going back to 2000, the baseline sample was drawn anew for the
September 2001 round which is why we begin our analysis with data from this round. And, although the LFS survey
has continued biannually since March 2004, we cannot use additional waves of post-data in our analysis since the
survey stopped reporting whether the individual resides in an urban or a rural area, thus making it impossible for
us to condition our sample on urban domestic workers.
26There is a panel data component of the LFS survey, but we have some concerns about the representativeness
and quality of the panel data set of workers. First, since the design of the panel includes a 20% out-rotation of
dwellings in each six month period, in order to appear in the panel a worker needs to be living continuously in the
same place for six waves and needs to escape the out-rotation group. We expect that workers who are more likely
to retain employment are also more likely to appear in the panel, making the estimation of the eects of the law on
such a selected sample dicult. Second, we learned from Statistics South Africa (the organization that collects the
LFS data) that some panel matches could not be made, because some fraction of questionnaires from the pre-period
were lost in a ood. We have no way to know what impact this would have on the representativeness of the panel.
13of the minimum wage law. He points out that the 2001 Census under-counted the fraction of
women of working age and that the extrapolations between 1996 and 2001 overestimated growth
in the adult population by underestimating the eect of the HIV epidemic on adult totals. He
notes that \no consistent ocial series of sampling weights is available. This poses a serious
problem, as both the changes in scale and the changes in the age, gender, province, and race
group distributions result in artifactual changes in the measured employment of domestic workers
that are too large to be ignored." Indeed, the original sample weights that he refers to have been
shown to produce inconsistent aggregate statistics over time. More formally, Branson (2009)
explains that \The StatsSA weights presented in the data are problematic for analyses over time
... the auxiliary data used as a benchmark in the post-stratication adjustment are unreliable and
inconsistent over time and hence result in temporal inconsistencies even at the aggregate level."
For these reasons, we do not use the weights provided with the LFS data. Rather, our
results use new (individual-level) survey weights that have been constructed by Nicola Branson
(2009) using entropy estimation.27 These weights produce \consistent demographic and
geographic trends", as Branson (2009) shows.
3.3 Sample selection, key variables and empirical strategy
Our sample of workers includes all urban African and coloured woman aged 20 to 59, who report
domestic work, who do not also own their own business and who have no more than high school
education. For the employment analysis, we use an expanded sample of all African or coloured
woman aged 20 to 59 who live in urban areas, who have no more than a high school level of
education and who are employed or looking for work. For the placebo test, we make use of a
sample of male urban African and coloured workers, aged 20 to 59, who have no more than a high
27These methods are described in Branson (2009). Briey, the idea is to create a new set of weights that are as
close to the original weights as possible (to preserve the main features of the sample design) but that are adjusted
to account for errors arising from time inconsistent benchmarks, from inconsistencies between household and person
weights, and for errors in the trimming of weights in earlier survey years. We are grateful to Branson for making
these weights available to us.
14school education and who report working in the manufacturing sector.
In the LFS, all workers are asked about earnings, pay frequency and usual weekly hours of
work. Most workers report earnings and a corresponding pay frequency. The vast majority{ 89%
of domestic workers { report a monthly pay frequency. We convert all earnings to monthly
amounts using the pay frequency information. About 8-9% of domestic workers in any one wave
do not report earnings at all and we exclude these individuals from our analysis.28 To capture
hours of work, we use the response to the question \How many hours do you usually work in a
week?" We construct hourly wage measures by dividing monthly earnings by monthly hours. We
construct monthly hours as Usual hours worked per weekAverage weeks in a month. Just over
5% of workers report working more than 70 hours a week and we exclude these individuals from
our analysis.
We describe the impact of the minimum wage law in two ways. First, we estimate
non-parametric kernel densities of domestic worker wages and earnings and test for dierences in
the domestic worker distributions over time using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the equality of
distributions. Then, we statistically test for whether outcomes changed in the period after the law
compared to before the law, and for whether these changes are larger in areas where the minimum
wage initially had more \bite". We specify the following dierence-in-dierences regression model:
yijt = 0 + 1POSTt + 2WGj + 3POSTt  WGj + Xijt + ijt (1)
where yijt is one of four main outcome variables for individual i living in province j in
period t: log hourly wages, weekly hours of work, the possession of a formal job contract for the
set of domestic workers, and whether the individual is employed as a domestic worker or not,
among the set of demographically similar women. Equation (1) is estimated with and without
controls for worker characteristics (Xijt), including age, years of education and an indicator
variable for whether the person is African. We group data from the September 2001, March 2002
28The fraction of domestic workers with no earnings information is not signicantly dierent across waves.
15and September 2002 surveys into a \Pre" period and the remaining three waves into the \POST"
period. Because the law was formally announced on August 30, 2002, but employers were only
expected to be compliant from 1 November 2002, there is some ambiguity about whether the
September 2002 wave belongs in the pre- or post-period. There was substantial publicity in the
months prior to the law becoming eective, making it plausible that some employers started to
react even before the November 1st deadline. For this reason, we also present results from
regressions that omit the September 2002 cusp wave, for which \POSTt" is not well-dened.
These are our preferred estimates.
To construct a measure of the intensity of the minimum wage law, we follow other
examples in the minimum wage literature (notably Lee, 1999) that use aggregate (rather than
individual) data on workers over time and construct a locally-specic wage gap using data on
wages from the \PRE" period. We dene the province-level wage gap as:
WGj = log[min(w)]   log[median(wj)] (2)
where min(w) is the urban full-time minimum wage in November 2002 and median(wj) is
the median wage of all urban domestic workers in the province before the law. That is, the
intensity of the minimum wage law is measured according to domestic worker conditions in local
labor markets in September 2001 and March 2002.
The parameter 2 represents the average dierence in outcomes for domestic workers in
low wage gap versus high wage gap areas across the entire period. 3 is the
dierence-in-dierences parameter and tells us how much more outcomes changed, in areas where
the minimum wage was most binding. In order for 3 to identify the eect of the minimum wage
law in high WGj areas, we must assume that in the absence of the law change, low wage gap
provinces would be on the same trend in outcomes as high wage gap provinces.
In addition to 3, 1 is also a parameter of interest as it tells us how wages (and other
16outcomes) for domestic workers changed on average after the law. In most dierence-in-dierences
analyses this parameter is not directly of interest and the POSTt variable is included simply to
absorb common, contemporaneous shocks to outcomes or common trends. However, in the context
of this study, the minimum wage oor cuts so high in the distribution of domestic worker wages
that we expect at least a portion of 1 to reect the impact of the law on average domestic worker
outcomes. This claim is, of course, dicult to make in the absence of evidence on economy-wide
trends in other wages. So, as a placebo test, we implement the same regression model as in (1) for
a set of workers for whom the minimum wage law is irrelevant and who do not directly compete
with domestic workers for jobs. These workers are male, low-skilled manufacturing workers in
urban areas. The minimum wage law for domestic workers does not apply to them and, moreover,
is set at a level far below their median wage. Changes in male manufacturing wages and hours of
work give us some indication of what is going on in the South African economy at the same time
as the new minimum wage law comes into place. We will be interested in testing whether 1 and
3 are the same for the sample of manufacturing workers and domestic workers. If 1 is dierent,
this implies that the coecient on POSTt in the domestic worker regression captures some of the
impact of the new law, over and above any economy-wide shocks to wages. If 3 is dierent, this
implies domestic worker wages (or other outcomes) are changing more in high wage gap relative to
low wage gap areas, and that these dierential changes are not simply a reection of broad trend
dierences across high wage gap and low wage gap areas.
Note that our measure of the intensity of the law, WGt, is captured at the provincial level.
This means that in estimating (1), we exploit variation at the group (province) level to identify
the eects of the law. The fact that there are only nine groups (provinces) presents a challenge for
inference. Consider the following error components model for the error term ijt in (1):
ijt = vj + ijt (3)
Standard OLS without adjustment of the standard errors treats each individual as if they
17contribute equally and independently to the variation in outcomes. Since  = v +  and vj is
the same for each individual in the same province (the main policy change occurs at an aggregated
level), this approach overstates the amount of variation in our data. The situation is not quite as
dire as only having nine observations, since we also have individual-level control variables that
dier within provinces and which account for a large part of the variation in outcomes. However,
it is clear that some adjustment for the grouped nature of the error term is called for.
We take two approaches. First, we follow the common recommendation in the literature
to estimate Eicker-White clustered standard errors at the level of the group (province).29
However, the standard asymptotic arguments for the consistency of clustered standard errors may
not apply with the small number of groups in our context, even given the additional variation
found in the demographic controls. We still run the risk of underestimating standard errors (and
over-rejecting the null) using this approach.
As a second approach, we follow Donald and Lang's (2007) suggestion and implement
their two-step estimator which, under some conditions, produces standard errors that
appropriately take into account the group-specic term in (3). To implement this, we rst regress
outcomes on all individual level variables, the POSTt variable, a full set of province dummy
variables and a full set of POSTt*province interaction dummy variables. Then, we take the
estimated coecients from these province indicators and from the POSTt*province interaction
terms and use them as the outcomes in a second stage regression. This second stage involves
regressing the estimated coecients on a POSTt indicator, the WGj measure and the interaction
POSTt  WGj. The resulting standard errors from this second stage model are calculated with
the group-component of  taken into account and, together with the second stage coecients,
form t statistics that have the t distribution when the number of groups is small.30 There is a nice
29This approach to estimating appropriate standard errors in a dierence-in-dierences specication is discussed
in Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan (2004) and in Donald and Lang (2007), among others.
30The conditions required for this result are that the number of individuals in each province is large and that the
underlying vj's are normally distributed. We must assume the latter condition, and have at least 600 observations
in each \group" giving us some condence in the former condition. For more details on this procedure, see Donald
and Lang (2007).
18intuition for this estimator: the rst stage regression produces estimates of the group-level means
in the post-period (these are the coecients on the province indicator variables and the
POSTt*province interactions) after taking into account variation in the other individual controls.
In the second stage, we estimate how much of this variation in these group-level (estimated)
means is predicted by variation in POSTt, WGj and POSTt  WGj.31
In addition to the graphical evidence from the kernel densities and the
dierence-in-dierences statistical tests, we implement two tests to investigate the mechanisms
through which the new minimum wage law had an eect. We are particularly interested in
understanding whether or not employers are complying with the law primarily because they are
concerned with penalties and external enforcement.
Our rst test shows that there is only partial compliance with the law. That is, some
employers are responding to the law, but their response is insucient for compliance. In the
absence of individual-level panel data which we could use to test whether a worker experiences
only partial wage adjustment to the law, we devise a related test for partial compliance using
repeated cross-sections. First, we classify domestic workers into each of three bins, where the `near
compliant' bin consists of workers earning the minimum or up to 10% below the minimum, the
`compliant' bin contains all workers who earn above the minimum and the non-compliant bin
contains workers that are earning more than 10% below the minimum. We estimate an ordered
probit model of the log of hourly wages on a constant, a POSTt indicator and a set of demographic
and geographic controls (in a rst specication) and then also include controls for the wage gap
and the POSTt  WGj interaction (in a second specication). We then predict the relevant
marginal eects to estimate the change in the probability of being in the `near compliant' bin and
test for whether this change is positive. Appendix 1 sets out the details of how we derive this test
as the relevant one for partial compliance. The intuition behind the test is that if the probability
31In the absence of demographic or other controls that vary within province, this two-step estimator is equivalent
to collapsing the data to the province-year level and estimating a form of the dierence-in-dierences specication
on these province-level means. However, we use the two-step estimator here to take advantage of the fact that we
have individual level controls that do matter for outcomes, while not overstating the amount of policy variation we
have to identify the impact of the law.
19of workers reporting wages in the non-compliant bin falls by more than the probability of workers
reporting wages in the compliant bin rises, then some workers are earning more than they were
before (shifting to the near-compliant region), but not enough more to make them compliant with
the law. Such a result would be consistent with an argument whereby employers are responding,
but not because they are law-abiding. Note that this interpretation of the test relies on there
being no large employment adjustment to the law, a fact that our earlier estimates demonstrate.
Our second test shows that the size of the wage eect is not related to a proxy for the
probability of being audited by the DoL. Although we have described above how the probability of
being monitored was very small, it is still possible that domestic workers themselves may have
threatened to report non-compliant employers to the authorities. Indeed, Hertz (2006) reports an
immediate increase in the number of domestic worker complaints made to the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) after the law is introduced. The relevant labor
authorities we consider here are housed in local LCs. We use the presence of an LC in the worker's
local labor market as a proxy for higher probability of audit, and we control for this proxy and its
interactions with POSTt, WGj and POSTt  WGj. Here, the local labor market is dened as the
magisterial district in which the domestic worker resides; which is a more disaggregated measure
than the province. If employers respond to the law because they fear external enforcement, we
should see wages rising by more in places with an LC, compared to places without.
4 Results
4.1 Before-After and Dierence-in-Dierences comparisons
The introduction of a minimum wage in the domestic worker industry appears to have had
immediate and substantial eects on earnings and wages of the average domestic worker, yet
limited eects on hours of work. Table 1 shows the large jump in mean wages and earnings
between September 2002 and March 2003 (16 cents and 48ZAR respectively) and an even larger
20increase by March 2004 (70 cents and 124ZAR). In the 16 months after September 2002, nominal
monthly earnings increase by 22% and nominal wages by 18%. In a market that was previously
experiencing decreases in nominal wages in September 2001 and March 2002, this is a phenomenal
increase in a very short space of time. The fraction of workers paid above the minimum increases
from about one-quarter in September 2001 and March 2002, to 45% in the last wave of the data.
Another striking result from Table 1 is that the variance of wages and earnings in the
post periods indicate a signicant increase in dispersion relative to the pre-period. This is
unusual, since wage compression is typically observed in response to increases in binding minimum
wage laws. This stretching out of the distribution for domestic workers suggests that either some
employers at the lowest end are not responding to the law at all, or that employers at the high end
are also increasing wages even though they are already compliant with the law, or both.
Figures 1 and 2 underscore the ndings in Table 1. Each gure is a kernel
density-smoothed plot of the earnings and wage densities in September 2001 (14 months before
the law), March 2002 (8 months before the law) September 2002 (2 months before the law), March
2003 (5 months after the law), September 2003 (10 months after the law) and March (2004) (16
months after the law). The vertical line represents the urban full-time minimum. Pre-law, there is
no evidence in the graph that earnings are shifting, despite ination rates of 6-7% per annum.32
However, each gure shows that the entire (log) earnings and wage distributions shift to the right,
in March 2003 with a pronounced mass in the lower tail moving towards the minimum wage line.
The shift is even more pronounced by September 2003 and March 2004. We tested for signicant
dierences between these distributions using Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in all pairwise
comparisons of each wave. Each of the post-law distributions is signicantly dierent from each of
the pre-law distributions. In addition to the prominent shift in wages and earnings after the law,
it is clear from these gures that a large fraction of domestic workers continue to earn less than
the minimum, and that there is no spike at the minimum that is characteristic of US data for low
32From the CPIX index provided by Statistics South Africa.
21wage workers (Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 2002).33
We consider the shifting of the wage distributions in Figure 1 to be strong evidence that
domestic worker wages increased in response to the law, since the shifts are large and line up well
with the timing of the law. However, it is still possible that other factors might aect the level of
wages in the POST period and confound the eect of the law. For this reason, we would like to
know whether wages increased to a larger extent in places where the minimum wage was more
binding. Figure 3 provides the basic information we use in our dierence-in-dierences regression.
The gure shows the mean (log) hourly wage for domestic workers in each wave, for each of the
nine provinces. The black dashed vertical lines demarcate the pre-, cusp and post-periods, while
the red dashed horizontal line denotes the urban full-time minimum hourly wage set in November
2002. The graph shows that all but one province had mean hourly wages far below the minimum
wage prior to the law. There is no clear evidence of pre-trends in wages that dier between
provinces; in a couple of provinces, mean wages look like they increase somewhat in the \cusp"
wave of September 2002 (WC, NP and MP). And, although all provinces evidence an increase in
mean wages after September 2002, this increase appears to be steeper for provinces falling further
below the minimum prior to the law. The gure shows clearly that mean log hourly wage measures
are \bunching together" for provinces further away from the minimum in the post-law period.
In Table 2, we statistically test for these changes. The table presents our main
dierence-in-dierences results for domestic worker wages. Results from the OLS regression of (1),
with robust standard errors clustered at the province level, are shown in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6. In
columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 we present the results from the two-step estimator of Donald and Lang
(2007). The rst four columns contain results for the full sample of domestic workers and the last
four columns restrict the sample by excluding domestic workers in the \cusp" wave of September
2002. We present results without demographic controls (age, education and African indicator) in
33We rule out the possibility that these shifts in the wage distribution are driven by compositional changes in
the type of domestic workers employed after the law is imposed. In Appendix 2, we use a simple propensity score
re-weighting technique (as in Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996)) to show that the shift in the distribution of
observable characteristics (Appendix 2, Figure 1) for workers accounts for a small fraction of the actual shift in
wages (Appendix 2, Figure 2).
22each odd-numbered column and results from regressions that include the demographic controls in
each even-numbered column. All regressions are weighted.34
Across all columns, there is a large, signicant increase in wages in the post period, of
between 18.9 and 21.7%. This reects the information in Table 1 and in Figure 3: average wages
across all domestic workers increase signicantly.35 Recall that the pre-law wage gap (WGj) is
dened so that the further below the median wage in a province is from the national minimum,
the larger (more positive) value this gap variable takes on. Not surprisingly, in places with larger
WGj, average wages are signicantly lower in the pre-period. However, in the POST period,
provinces that were further behind are the ones where the wage response is the largest, as was
indicated in Figure 3. The coecient on POSTt  WGj is large and positive in each specication
and signicantly dierent from zero in both OLS and two-step estimator results, for the sample
that excludes September 2002.36 For a worker who lives in the province with the largest
(demeaned) pre-law wage gap (0.36), the average increase in wages after the law is about 25%
using either the OLS (0.203 + 0.36*0.145) or the two-step (0.201 + 0.36*0.15) results.
In contrast to these large wage eects that appear shortly after the law, hours of work for
domestic worker do not exhibit similar signicant declines in the POST period.37 Table 3 presents
results of the form in Table 2, but where the outcome is usual weekly hours of work. Across
specications, the point estimate on the POSTt indicator is between -0.9 and -1.1 and never
statistically signicant. Regardless of the method of estimation, the coecient on POSTt  WGj
is larger and negative, suggesting that hours declined more (between -2.8 and -5.1 hours more) in
areas where the initial wage gap was larger. This is between a 7 and 12% fall in employment on
the intensive margin. However, we cannot reject that these estimated changes in hours of work are
34Results from the unweighted regressions for log hourly wages are presented in Appendix Table 1 for comparison.
35The wage gap measure is demeaned; so the coecient on POSTt can be interpreted as the average change in
wages for domestic workers in areas with the average wage gap measure.
36The relevant critical values from the t distribution for a one-tailed test with 5 degrees of freedom are 2.05 (p<0.05
signicance) and 1.47 (p<0.1 signicance). For a two-tailed test, the relevant critical values are 2.57 (p <0.05) and
2.05 (p<0.1). We use the t distribution because the number of observations in the second step estimation is small.
37Sample size changes across tables as more workers report hours of work information than report monthly earnings.
Results from the unweighted regressions for weekly hours of work are presented in Appendix Table 2 for comparison.
23zero; none of the coecients on the POSTt  WGj variable is close to being precisely estimated.
Of course, it is possible that measurement error in reports of hours of work undermines our ability
to precisely estimate the eect of the law on hours of work. Nevertheless, we nd no strong
statistical evidence that employers adjusted labor demand on the intensive margin in order to
aord the massive increase in wages that are evident in the data.
There is also no evidence that employers adjusted on the extensive margin. If domestic
workers lose jobs as a result of the law, we should see dierent probabilities of low-skilled African
and coloured women being employed as domestic workers POST-law. Table 4 presents
dierence-in-dierences results for the binary outcome \Does the individual work as a domestic
worker?". The sample here includes domestic workers and demographically similar women who
are working or searching for work. Dening the sample in this way allows for the possibility that
domestic workers may switch to other jobs or lose jobs altogether in the POST period. None of
the estimated coecients on the POSTt or POSTt  WGj variables is large, or statistically
signicant, under any specication.38
4.2 Placebo test: dierence-in-dierences for other workers
One of the points that dierentiates our study from other dierence-in-dierences approaches to
estimating the impact of the minimum wage law is what we are interested in the POSTt
parameter 1 as well as the dierence-in-dierences parameter 3. The reason for this is that the
38Other types of extensive margin adjustments (of type rather than number of domestic workers) may have altered
the composition of domestic workers and contributed to observed earnings shifts. For example, in the POST-period,
employers might try harder to select higher quality workers once the law is in place and as a result pay these higher
quality domestic workers more. That these changes drive the results we see is ruled out in our propensity-score
reweighting exercise in Appendix 2. We check whether the distribution of observable characteristics of domestic
workers changes signicantly over the period by estimating a probit model of the probability of being a domestic
worker in the PRE-period (yi = 0) or the POST period (yi = 1) and plotting the distribution of predicted probabil-
ities for each period in Appendix Figure 1. There is substantial overlap in the propensity scores in the two periods
but also a noticeable rightwards shift in the distribution of scores POST-law. To check whether these changes can
account for the large shifts in earnings we see after the law, we apply a propensity score weight to the earnings data
of observations in the pre-period and graph three kernel density plots of the distribution of earnings reported by
workers: the pre-law distribution, the POST distribution and the POST distribution re-weighted for the distribution
of characteristics observed in the pre-period (as in Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996). Appendix 2 Figure 2 shows
that re-weighting in this way does not eliminate the shift in wages from the PRE- to the POST-period.
24minimum wage was set so high in the distribution of domestic worker wages, potentially having
eects on workers in all provinces, not just those with the largest pre-law gap between median and
minimum wage. We saw from Table 2 that wages increase by about 20% for all domestic workers,
suggesting that this law had a large impact for the average worker. However, we would like to be
more condent that this 20% increase is not solely the result of a large, positive, economy-wide
shock to wages occurring at the same time as the minimum wage is introduced.
In Table 5, we present results from our placebo experiment. We implement our main
estimating equation in (1) for a group of workers that work in the same areas where our sample of
domestic workers are employed (urban areas) but who are not subject to the minimum wage law.
These workers are male manufacturing African or coloured workers, who have low levels of
education.39 The rst four columns present OLS and two-step estimator results for log hourly
wages, and the nal four columns present OLS and two-step estimator results for weekly hours of
work. For brevity, we only present the results that exclude individuals appearing in the \cusp"
wave of September 2002 (results for the full sample are available upon request).
For the sample of manufacturing workers, wages increase by 9 to 10% in the POST
period, although this change is not signicant once we take into account the grouped nature of the
data (columns 3 and 4). Moreover, the change in wages for manufacturing workers in high wage
gap areas does not seem to be signicantly higher in the POST period. These estimates suggest
that our dierence-in-dierences estimates of the wage eects of the law for domestic workers in
Table 2 do actually reect the full impact of the law and not simply dierential wage trends in
high and low wage gap provinces. They also suggest that we may not be able to attribute the
entire 20% increase in domestic worker wages in the POST period to the new law. If we take the
OLS regression results in columns 1 and 2, Table 5, seriously, we are able to reject that the change
in mean wages from pre- to post-periods is the same for female domestic workers and male
manufacturing workers (the condence interval for the estimate of 1 for domestic workers does
not contain 10%). However, what we learn from combining the results of Tables 2 and 5 is that
39Recall from the discussion of the domestic worker sector that the majority of domestic workers are female.
25only about one-half (10%) of the wage increase for domestic workers after the law reects the
impact of this law.
Turning to hours of work: these are decreasing somewhat for male manufacturing workers
in the post period, and by similar magnitudes - although these changes are not signicant in our
two-step results. Hours of work increase in the post period in high wage gap areas, although these
are again, not signicantly dierent from zero once we take into account the grouped nature of the
error term in (1) in the presence of a small number of groups. Overall then, the evidence from the
sample of male manufacturing workers does not point to dierential trends in wages or hours of
work across high and low wage gap provinces; nor does it seem that the entirety of the 20%
increase in domestic worker wages after the law can be accounted for by contemporaneous shocks
that these manufacturing workers are also experiencing.40
4.3 Testing for partial compliance
In this section, we provide suggestive evidence that some of the wage increases that occur after
the law are only in partial compliance with the minimum. This is important to show, because it
gives us some sense of how this informal labor market operates. It suggests that the eects of the
law are not simply driven by a subset of employer-types who are law-abiding; rather that some
employers are voluntarily choosing whether and how much to comply with the law.
Table 6 presents results from the ordered probit model we estimated for an outcome
variable that classies a worker's wage into a range below, near or above the minimum in each
wave. Since the choice of cut-os for being \near" the minimum is arbitrary, we perform this test
dening \near" in two dierent ways: a wage 10% or less than the minimum and a wage 20% or
less than the minimum. Recalling from the discussion above and as described in Appendix 1, the
idea of the test is that if the probability of a worker reporting a wage in the non-compliant bin
40Tests for the dierences in coecients across domestic worker and manufacturing worker samples are implemented
in a dierence-in-dierence-in-dierences specication. Estimates not shown for brevity.
26falls by more than the probability of a worker earning a wage in the compliant bin rises, then
some workers are earning more than they were before, but not enough more to bring them into
compliance with the law. This test is informative as long as there are no large employment
responses to the law, which we showed above in Table 4. The rst three columns of Table 6
present results for the specication that includes only a POSTt indicator and a constant (in
column (1)) and other demographic control variables including age, education and race of worker
(in columns (2) and (3)). Results presented are the marginal eects from the ordered probit.
To interpret results, consider the coecients in column (1). In the POST period, the
probability of a worker reporting hourly wages below 10% below the minimum falls by 14.9%. In
the same period, the probability of earning above the minimum increased by only 14.2%. This
means that a signicant 0.7% of the reduction in mass at the lower end of the distribution shifted
into the narrow band near the minimum. Adding controls does not change this result
substantially (column (2)), although changing the denition of \near" compliant does result in a
larger increase in the fraction of domestic workers earning wages near the minimum (column (3)):
1.2%. The coecient on POSTt is signicantly dierent from zero, suggesting that some of the
shift in wages is indeed only in partial compliance with the law.
The last three columns in Table 5 present marginal eects from the ordered probit model
of domestic worker wage categories that includes controls for POSTt, the log wage gap in the
province before the law, the interaction of these two variables, a constant (in column (4)) and age,
education and race (in columns (5) and (6)). The only marginal eects we show here are the
coecients on the POSTt term (top three rows) and the coecients on the interaction of
POSTt  WGj (bottom three rows). The message from these results is the same: between 0.8%
and 1% of domestic workers shifted from the lower part of the wage distribution towards (but not
up to) the new minimum. This partial response to the law does not appear to be signicantly
larger in the provinces where the minimum wage had the most bite. The change in fraction with
near-compliant wages in high wage gap provinces is between 0.4% and 0.5% larger than in
27provinces with the mean wage gap but these dierences are not statistically dierent from zero.41
The results of this test indicate partial compliance from the lower part of the wage
distribution, in all provinces. The evidence on increasing dispersion in wages and earnings in
Table 1 and the increases in mean log hourly wages for domestic workers in the Western Cape
(Figure 3){ the only province where the mean wage was initial above the minimum{ point toward
an employer response at levels much higher in the distribution. Together, these pieces of evidence
suggest that some employers are responding to the law in ways dierent to those predicted by
conventional compliance models. In the next section, we present a nal test that tries to rule out
the possibility that employer responses are driven by a desire to avoid penalties associated with
non-compliance.
4.4 Testing for compliance related to probability of audit
To learn more about how much employer behavior may be driven by the threat of external
sanction, we investigate the responsiveness of wages to the presence of a local LC. Having a LC
nearby should increase the actual probability of audit as well as employer beliefs about their
likelihood of being monitored. While this is not the only aspect of a local labor market that could
increase the likelihood of being caught for non-compliance, it is a plausible feature that
distinguishes markets and it is feasible to obtain data on these oces. Having a nearby LC
represents a lower cost of complaint for the domestic worker. We tracked down the physical
addresses of these LCs and matched each one to a unique magisterial district in the LFS, a
geographic unit that is more disaggregated than the province. Since the LCs were primarily
established to serve formal sector workers in the rest of the economy, it is unlikely that their
location is endogenous to the prevalence of domestic worker employers or to the presence of
non-compliant employers of domestic workers; however, the LCs are likely to be over-represented
in areas with more economic activity in the formal sector. Across all waves, 75% of domestic
41We estimate ordered probits for log earnings and nd similar evidence of partial compliance behavior. Results
available upon request.
28workers live in magisterial districts where there is at least one LC.
In Table 7, we estimate wage regressions of the form in Table 2, now including a control
for whether the domestic worker lives in a magisterial district with an LC, the interaction of this
indicator with POSTt, with WGj and the triple interaction POSTt*WGj*LCijt. We estimate
equation (1) again using OLS (and clustered standard errors) as well as using the two-step
estimator. Interestingly, the OLS results indicate that domestic worker wages are about 11-12%
higher in areas that have an LC (in columns (1), (2), (5), (6)) and that LCs tend to oset the
eect of working in a province where the median wage in the pre-period is below the minimum
(coecient on LC  WG). However, neither of these dierences are evident once we estimate the
model using the two-step procedure. Furthermore, there seems to be no evidence that having an
LC in one's local labor market increases the impact of the minimum wage for domestic workers;
employers who raise wages are not doing so dierentially in areas where the likelihood of being
caught for non-compliance is higher. Although it is never possible to precisely estimate the
coecient on LC  WG  POST, the coecient on this triple-dierence term is negative, pointing
in the \wrong direction" for the mechanism that has employers responding more in areas with a
higher probability of audit.
4.5 Contract coverage
Historically, remuneration for domestic workers has included a combination of cash and in-kind
benets. It is therefore possible that the entire shift in the wage distribution could have been
facilitated by a change in the structure of remuneration: increases in wages in response to the law
may have been oset by decreases in in-kind payments. Ideally, we would like to know whether
the minimum wage law and all of its components had any real eects on conditions of employment
for domestic workers. The minimum wage determination also mandated formal labor contracts in
the domestic work sector; hence, we consider the impact of the law on this important
non-pecuniary aspect of the work relationship.
29Figure 4 shows the basic result for contract coverage: the fraction of domestic workers
covered by a formal job contract is below 30% in all provinces up until March 2003. Then, this
fraction increases substantially, across all provinces, in September 2003 and March 2004. In Table
8, we present the dierence-in-dierences comparisons for the outcome \Does the worker have a
written contract of employment?" Across all specications, regardless of whether the \cusp" wave
is omitted or not, there is a 16-20 percentage point increase in the fraction of domestic workers
covered by an employment contract. Considering that the baseline contract coverage rate was
about 10%, this more than doubling of the rate of coverage in the year after the law is enacted is
remarkable. In addition, the evidence in this table suggests that the average domestic worker
beneted from these changes, regardless of whether or not they worked in a province paying far
below the minimum. Although it is possible that only the employers already paying compliant
wages are the ones establishing formal wage contracts with their employees, at the aggregate level,
Figure 4 suggests that increases in contract coverage are not primarily driven by provinces where
mean wages were already in compliance with the law (i.e. the Western Cape). In fact, these
dierences do not appear to be related to the intensity of the new wage oor across provinces (this
is evident in both the Figure 4 and Table 8 results).
We view this last set of results as particularly important. Contracts of employment
include provisions regarding pay, overtime pay, pension and other benets, vacation time and rules
about fair termination of employment. What we are seeing in the LFS is that the employment
relationship for many domestic workers became more formal immediately after the law, regardless
of their position in the wage distribution. These workers gained protections that they previously
did not have access to, and so the new regulation appears to have initiated the formalization of
the industry. This process could have far-reaching consequences for the nature of domestic work in
South Africa.
305 Discussion and conclusions
The introduction of a new minimum wage law in a previously unregulated informal market
presents a unique opportunity to examine important issues around responses to legal wage oors.
It also allows us a window into how informal labor markets operate and the conditions under
which they might formalize.
Although conditions in and characteristics of the domestic worker industry in South
Africa were stable before the introduction of a minimum wage, wages in this sector rose
signicantly and substantially { at least 10% compared with other workers { POST-law. When
we consider the dierence-in-dierences results, it is clear that domestic workers who work in
areas where the pre-law median wage is below the minimum (i.e. where the new law has more
\bite") experienced even larger increases in wages in the POST-period. Despite the absence of
full compliance and a sharp wage spike at the minimum, we nd evidence of a strong wage
response to the law, and little statistical evidence that the law had a negative eect on work on
the intensive or extensive margin. The main purpose of our paper has been to document these
changes and to provide evidence that labor market regulation in an informal sector of considerable
importance can have real impact, even without monitoring or enforcement.
Given that issues of compliance are not often at the center of empirical work on minimum
wages42, it is worthwhile considering how our results should be interpreted. One possible reason
that the law had an eect is that some fraction of employers erroneously believed that the
government was going to enforce the new minimum and penalize non-compliers. A diculty with
this explanation is that it cannot account for wage or earnings increases for domestic workers
already paid more than the minimum before the law. Although we do not have a panel data set of
workers to test this directly, the fact that the wage and earnings distribution fanned out (the
variance increased) rather than compressing after the law suggests that some employers increased
42For comprehensive reviews of the minimum wage literature, see Brown (1999), Card and Krueger (1997) and
Neumark and Wascher (1995, 2007).
31wages in excess of the minimum, despite already being compliant with the law.
A second reason that an unenforced law may have been eective relates to models of
fairness in wage-setting. A theoretical literature in labor economics posits that the notion of a fair
wage is important in incentivizing workers to provide high eort in tasks for which eort is
unobservable (Akerlof, 1982, 1984 and Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). These models are dicult to
test empirically, since dening and measuring a fair wage, or a reference wage, is tricky in
practice.43 Experimental studies have separately established the importance of gift exchange and
fairness intentions in employer-employee relationships.44 In the case of the domestic worker
industry in South Africa, it is plausible that the announcement of a wage oor dened, or
re-dened, what the fair wage was and set in motion voluntary employer responses, even though
the two traditional channels for encouraging compliance{ enforcement and penalties{ were closed
o.45 What we take from our analysis is that in the initial stages of labor market formalization,
governments may need to accept partial compliance with new legislation in order to bring about
real changes in outcomes without signicant disemployment.46 Even without enforcement, such
legislation can move the market towards a more formal setting, if, for example, it increases
contract coverage, as in the South African case.
We emphasize that our conclusions are valid for the domestic worker industry, which is
one example of an informal sector. The dynamics of the employment relationship between a single
employer and a single employee no doubt condition the response to the law and so may only be
43Mas (2006) is an exception.
44See for example Brandts and Charness (2004), who show that a minimum wage may undermine the eciencies
that gift-exchange can achieve, Falk et al (2000) discuss how fairness intentions matter for behavior and Fehr et
al (1997) model how reciprocity in response to fair behavior expands the set of enforceable contracts that can be
sustained in an economy. Konow (2003) reviews the large body of experimental evidence on fairness. Falk, Fehr
and Zehnder (2005) provide a model and experimental evidence that the announcement of a minimum wage raises
workers' reservation wages in a persistent way. Reservation wages remain high even after the wage oor is removed,
suggesting that policy interventions may have direct and indirect eects on behavior by altering the meaning of a
fair transaction and by creating `entitlement' eects.
45Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) present a theoretical model of a labor market in which employment increases when
the minimum wage increases, as a result of an eciency wage. However, they assume compliance with the law in
their model. They focus on showing how an eciency wage model can predict an increase in labor demand following
a minimum wage change.
46See Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2007) for a theoretical discussion of why non-compliance with a minimum wage
could be acceptable.
32relevant in some types of informal enterprizes. However, this characterization of the informal
sector may not be too far from a description of the typical small-scale rm that generates much
informal sector employment in developing countries.47 Also, our analysis is only relevant for the
short-run eects of a new minimum wage policy: while we nd clear eects in the 16 months after
the law, as employers face annual increases in this minimum (often above ination in the case of
South Africa) and as workers sort across space in response to these new protections, the wage,
earnings and employment eects of the policy may change as the sector itself becomes more
formal over time. For example, employers may decide to contract child-care out to day-care
centers which could have feedback eects on equilibrium wages, earnings, hours of work and
number of jobs for domestic workers. We leave questions about the longer-term eects of
formalizing the domestic worker market for future research.
47Banerjee and Duo (2006)) show that small-scale rms and entrepreneurial activities are an important source of
income for the poor.
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37Figure 1: Distribution of log hourly wages for urban domestic workers
Figure 2: Distribution of log monthly earnings for urban domestic workers
Kernel density plots of log hourly wages (bandwidth 0.02) and log monthly earnings (bandwidth 0.08). Data are from South African
Labor Force Surveys (March 2001-March 2004). The vertical line is at the level of the full-time minimum wage (monthly income) for
urban domestic workers. Each wave of data contains between 996 and 1,260 observations. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality of
distributions reject at the 5% level for each pairwise comparison of waves in the before and after periods.
38Figure 3: Mean hourly domestic worker wages by province over time
Each dot represents a province-wave level mean hourly wage for domestic workers, for waves before and after the law. The black vertical
dashed lines demarcate the period before (to the left) and the period after (to the right) the law, with the \cusp" period falling between
these lines. The red horizontal dashed line represents the urban full-time minimum wage (ZAR4.1) established in November 2002. All
data are from the South African Labor Force Surveys (March 2001-March 2004) and means are weighted. Provinces are: Western Cape
(WC), Eastern Cape (EC), Northern Cape (NC), Free State (FS), Kwazulu-Natal (KZN), Northern Province (NP), Gauteng (Gau),
Mpumalanga (MP) and Limpopo (LIM).
39Figure 4: Fraction of domestic workers with a formal job contract
Each dot represents a province-wave level fraction of domestic workers with a formal job contract, for waves before and after the law.
The black vertical dashed lines demarcate the period before (to the left) and the period after (to the right) the law, with the \cusp"
period falling between these lines. All data are from the South African Labor Force Surveys (March 2001-March 2004) and means
are weighted. Provinces are: Western Cape (WC), Eastern Cape (EC), Northern Cape (NC), Free State (FS), Kwazulu-Natal (KZN),
Northern Province (NP), Gauteng (Gau), Mpumalanga (Mp) and Limpopo (Lim).
40(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban 0.64 0.62 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.62
(0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
N 2,059 2,149 1,792 1,705 1,692 1,618
Conditional on urban status:
Age 40.25 39.87 40.77 40.61 40.51 40.66
(9.47) (9.25) (9.43) (8.97) (9.39) (9.55)
Education (years) 6.59 6.46 6.59 6.39 7.10 7.00
(3.39) (3.47) (3.50) (3.43) (3.35) (3.53)
African 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.90
(0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.28) (0.30)
Full-time 0.79 0.80 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.78
(0.41) (0.40) (0.43) (0.40) (0.40) (0.42)
Hours of work per week 42.01 43.20 41.21 41.83 40.60 38.00
(17.34) (17.69) (18.07) (16.59) (16.52) (14.10)
Nominal monthly earnings (ZAR) 539.55 541.42 559.27 608.79 678.57 684.89
(353.52) (350.07) (455.59) (384.01) (440.33) (514.74)
Nominal hourly wage (ZAR) 3.62 3.56 3.86 4.02 4.52 4.56
(2.61) (2.76) (3.35) (2.94) (4.26) (3.37)
Fraction paid >= minimum 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.45 0.45
(0.44) (0.44) (0.46) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50)
Fraction workers with a job contract 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.28 0.38
(0.30) (0.25) (0.31) (0.37) (0.45) (0.49)
  1,189 1,200 949 929 964 924
Table 1: Mean characteristics of domestic workers LFS 2001-2004
Data are from South African Labor Force Surveys (LFS 2001-2004). All data are self-reported by domestic workers and statistics are weighted.
Sample in the lower panel includes female African and coloured domestic workers aged 20-59 inclusive, each of whom have all information on the included 
variables and who live in urban areas.
A full-time worker is someone who reports at least 27 hours of work per week. The lowest wage provinces are the Northern province and the Eastern Cape: these 
provinces have the two lowest median hourly wages for domestic workers in the pre-period (September 2001 and March 2002).
POST PRE
Sept 2001 March 2002 March 2003 Sept 2003 Mar 2004
"Cusp" Sept 
2002(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.201*** 0.189*** 0.215*** 0.203*** 0.217*** 0.202***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) -0.858*** -0.820*** -0.829*** -0.792*** -0.902*** -0.862*** -0.868*** -0.827***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST 0.090** 0.097** 0.100 0.106 0.133*** 0.145*** 0.138** 0.150**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N N
N 6,154 6,154 18 18 5,205 5,205 18 18
Outcome is the log of hourly wages, computed by taking monthly earnings and dividing by usual number of hours worked per week.
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Table 2: Log hourly wages of domestic workers: Difference-in-differences
Robust standard errors presented in each column and all regressions are weighted. Each regression contains a constant (coefficient not shown). In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, standard errors 
are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance for two-step estimates are taken from the t-
distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample in columns 1-4 include domestic workers in all waves; sample in columns 5-8 exclude domestic workers in the 
September 2002 "cusp" wave. 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and median wage is 
the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
OLS OLS Two-step estimator
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
Two-step estimator(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST -0.887 -0.901 -0.848 -0.761 -1.149 -1.111 -0.874 -0.77
(0.82) (0.81) (1.58) (1.39) (1.18) (1.14) (1.62) (1.40)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) 5.151 3.98 5.758** 4.996** 5.383 4.1 6.675** 5.729**
(3.21) (2.58) (2.52) (2.17) (3.84) (3.01) (2.94) (2.48)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST -2.832 -3.309 -4.157 -4.283 -3.064 -3.579 -5.074 -5.128
(2.17) (2.28) (3.79) (3.50) (3.20) (3.23) (4.08) (3.70)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 6,876 6,876 18 18 5,824 5,824 18 18
Outcome is usual number of hours worked per week.
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Robust standard errors presented in each column and all regressions are weighted. Each regression contains a constant (coefficient not shown). In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, 
standard errors are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance for two-step 
estimates are taken from the t-distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample in columns 1-4 include domestic workers in all waves; sample in columns 5-
8 exclude domestic workers in the September 2002 "cusp" wave. 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and 
median wage is the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
Table 3: Usual weekly hours of work of domestic workers: Difference-in-differences
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
OLS Two-step estimator OLS Two-step estimator(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST -0.004 0.003 -0.012 -0.005 -0.010 -0.002 -0.014 -0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) 0.0409*** -0.014 0.0594** -0.008 0.0386** -0.0173** 0.0610** -0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST -0.004 0.002 -0.024 -0.017 -0.002 0.004 -0.025 -0.018
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 52,742 52,742 18 18 44,005 44,005 18 18
Outcome is whether the individual is employed as a domestic worker (1) or not (0).
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Robust standard errors presented in each column and all regressions are weighted. Each regression contains a constant (coefficient not shown). In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, 
standard errors are Eicker-White standard errors, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance of 
two-step estimates are taken from the t-distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample in columns 1-4 include employed or unemployed women aged 
20-59 (searching unemployed) who have no more than high school; sample in columns 5-8 excludes all of the individuals in this group who appear in the September 2002 
"cusp" wave. 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and 
median wage is the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
Table 4: Probability of working as a domestic worker: Difference-in-differences
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
OLS Two-step estimator OLS Two-step estimator(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST 0.103*** 0.0956*** 0.089 0.09 -0.913*** -0.880*** -0.755 -0.736
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.21) (0.22) (0.593) (0.554)
Pre-law wage gap -0.263** -0.240** -0.242** -0.203** 2.208** 1.670* 2.461** 2.013*
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.95) (0.82) (1.101) (0.957)
Pre-law wage gap*POST 0.042 0.042 0.002 0.003 1.366** 1.208* 0.795 0.744
(0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.59) (0.55) (1.438) (1.271)
N 3,631 3,631 18 18 4,824 4,824 18 18
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Table 5 Placebo test: Difference-in-differences for male manufacturing workers
Robust standard errors presented in each column and all regressions are weighted. Each regresssion contains a constant (coefficient not shown). In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, standard 
errors are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance of between estimates and for two-
step estimates are taken from the t-distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample includes all African and coloured male workers of relevant age and 
education level employed in manufacturing, in all waves excluding the cusp wave September 2002. 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and median 
wage is the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
OLS Two-step estimator
Log wages Weekly Hours of work
OLS Two-step estimatorδ1=0.8*wmin δ1=0.8*wmin
No controls All controls All controls No controls All controls All controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in fraction with non-compliant wages
Pr(w*=0|POST)-Pr(w*=0|PRE) -0.149*** -0.139*** -0.147*** -0.141*** -0.134*** -0.141***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Change in fraction with near-compliant wages
Pr(w*=1|POST)-Pr(w*=1|PRE) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Change in fraction with compliant wage
Pr(w*=2|POST)-Pr(w*=2|PRE) 0.142*** 0.132*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 0.127*** 0.131***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Change in fraction with non-compliant wages
Pr(w*=0|POST*WG)-Pr(w*=0|PRE*WG) -0.077 -0.084* -0.085*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050)
Change in fraction with near-compliant wages
Pr(w*=1|POST*WG)-Pr(w*=1|PRE*WG) 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Change in fraction with compliant wage
Pr(w*=2|POST*WG)-Pr(w*=2|PRE*WG) 0.073 0.080* 0.080*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047)
N workers 5,206 5,206 5,206 5,206 5,206 5,206
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. All regressions weighted.
Each specification includes a constant and an indicator for whether the observation is captured PRE or POST law. Columns (2) and (3), (5) and (6) present results from models 
which control for age, race, years of education. Columns (4), (5) and (6) present results from the specification that controls for a POST indicator, a measure of the log wage gap in 
the province before the law was in effect, and the interaction of POST with wage gap (WG). The estimates in the lower panel of columns (4)-(6) are the coefficients and standard 
errors on the interaction of POST*WG.
Sample restricted to urban female domestic workers ages 20-59 in pre- and post-periods (Sep 01-Mar 04), excluding the cusp wave (September 2002).
δ1=0.9*wmin δ1=0.9*wmin
Results are predicted changes in the probability of falling into one of three groups generated from an ordered probit model. The three groups are: non-compliant (w=0), near-
compliant (w=1) and compliant (w=2). The near-compliant group is defined as the set of wages 10% below the minimum or less; 20% below the minimum or less in each of 
columns (1-2) and  (3). Marginal effects are calculated using STATA's mfx command, which computes the "effect" of switching a binary variable from 0 to 1. 
Table 6: Testing for partial compliance in response to the law: Marginal effects from ordered probit
Average change in predicted probability of 
domestic worker reporting nominal wages in the 
non-compliant, near-compliant or compliant 
region
Before-After comparison Before-After comparison by intensity of the law(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST 0.239*** 0.240*** -0.212 -0.198 0.258*** 0.257*** -0.155 -0.164
(0.04) (0.04) (0.14) (0.24) (0.02) (0.02) (0.23) (0.23)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) -0.964*** -0.943*** -0.816** -0.761** -1.008*** -0.979*** -0.483 -0.422
(0.06) (0.08) (0.31) (0.38) (0.04) (0.06) (0.30) (0.30)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST 0.137 0.153 1.137* 1.088 0.180** 0.196*** 0.804 0.812
(0.10) (0.09) (0.46) (0.65) (0.06) (0.05) (0.61) (0.64)
Labor Center 0.116*** 0.114*** -0.184 -0.119 0.122*** 0.121*** -0.12 -0.058
(0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.20)
Labor Center*POST -0.051 -0.0636* 0.590* 0.555* -0.0568 -0.0716** 0.527 0.52
(0.04) (0.03) (0.18) (0.33) (0.03) (0.03) (0.32) (0.32)
Labor Center*WG 0.175** 0.201** -0.048 -0.077 0.175*** 0.193*** -0.647 -0.672
(0.07) (0.07) (0.49) (0.60) (0.04) (0.05) (0.48) (0.48)
Labor Center*WG*POST -0.080 -0.094 -1.407 -1.325 -0.079 -0.0884 -0.807 -0.798
(0.10) (0.09) (0.70) (0.96) (0.07) (0.07) (0.89) (0.93)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 6,154 6,154 36 36 5,205 5,205 36 36
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Table 7: Wage responses in areas with high versus low costs of complaint: Difference-in-differences
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
OLS Two-step estimator OLS Two-step estimator
Robust standard errors presented in each column and all regressions are weighted. Each regression contains a constant (coefficient not shown). In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, standard errors 
are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance for two-step estimates are taken from the t-
distribution (9-8=1 degree of freedom). See text for details. Sample in columns 1-4 include domestic workers in all waves; sample in columns 5-8 exclude domestic workers in the 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and median wage is 
the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
Outcome is the log of hourly wages. Labor Center=1 if the domestic workers in a magisterial district that contains at least one Labor Center (LC) for employee complaints.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.200*** 0.196***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) -0.119** -0.094** -0.124*** -0.106*** -0.101** -0.073** -0.100*** -0.075***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST -0.052 -0.046 -0.045 -0.044 -0.070 -0.062 -0.070 -0.067
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 6,784 6,784 18 18 5,743 5,743 18 18
Outcome is whether the domestic worker has a legal contract of employment. 
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Robust standard errors presented in each column and all regressions are weighted. Each regression contains a constant (coefficient not shown). In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, standard 
errors are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance for two-step estimates are taken from 
the t-distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample in columns 1-4 include domestic workers in all waves; sample in columns 5-8 exclude domestic workers in 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and median wage 
is the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
Table 8: Contract coverage for domestic workers: Difference-in-differences
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
OLS Two-step estimator OLS Two-step estimatorAppendix 1: Testing for evidence of incomplete wage
adjustment
Consider the gure below which shows the wage distribution F(.) of domestic worker wages in the
period before and after the law. FAfter is shifted to the right of FBefore and the solid black vertical
line at 2 represents the minimum wage level. Dene 1 as 90% of the minimum wage. Then,
classify all worker wages into one of three groups: wages below 1 are non-compliant, wages
between 1 and 2 are nearly compliant, and wages at or above 2 are compliant.
We would like to know whether the shift in the wage distribution in response to the law is
consistent with incomplete adjustment up to compliant levels. That is, are wages shifting up out
of the bottom part of the distribution, but not enough to get most workers up to or over the
minimum threshold? Some shifts in the distribution are consistent with this idea and some are
not. In example 1 below, the rst set of changes in the fraction of workers in each region would be
consistent with complete adjustment for some workers up to compliance: 10% of workers in each
of the non-compliant and near-compliant regions leave these regions; and 20% of workers join the
compliant region. The second example is, however, not consistent with full compliance for workers
who experience wage changes: 20% of workers leave the non-compliant region, and the
near-compliant region grows by 10% of workers as does the compliant region. While we cannot say
which exact workers are getting wage increase, as long as jobs are not being lost as a result of the
law change, then such shifts in the overall distribution reect partial adjustments in response to
the law.
Example 1
Non-compliant region Near compliant Compliant
Before 0.3 0.3 0.4
After 0.2 0.2 0.6
Example 2
Non-compliant region Near compliant Compliant
Before 0.3 0.3 0.4
After 0.1 0.4 0.5
Intuitively, we would like to know whether or not the fall in the fraction of domestic
workers in the non-compliant region is fully oset by the increase in fraction of workers in the
compliant region. We do this by implementing an ordered probit model and testing a specic
hypothesis. To describe the appropriate hypothesis, consider the following linear model of the log
of the individual worker's wage (wi) (ignoring covariates for now) where i  N(0;1):
wi = 0 + t1 + i, where t = 1 if the worker is observed in the after period and t = 0 if observed
in the before period. We dene an ordered categorical variable, w
i that captures the region that
each wage falls into:
w

i = 0 if wi  1 (1)A test for partial compliance
w

i = 1 if 1 < wi  2 (2)
w

i = 2 if wi > 2 (3)




i = 0) = Pr(wi  1) = Pr(0 + t1 + i  1) = (1   0   t1) (4)
Pr(w

i = 1) = Pr(1 < 0 + t1 + i  2) = (2   0   t1)   (1   0   t1) (5)
Pr(w

i = 2) = Pr(0 + t1 + i  2) = 1   Pr(0 + t1 + i  2) = 1   (2   0   t1) (6)


















Let the parameter combination described in the hypothesis statement be . If we reject
  0, this provides evidence consistent with some domestic workers getting wage increases that
are up to a level less than the minimum, i.e. up to a new but still non-compliant level in region
2   1.
Implementing this test is straightforward. To see this, note that we can write each of the








=  1(1   0   t1) (10)














=  1[(2   0   t1)   (1   0   t1)] =   (12)
We use this last partial derivative to re-state the null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 :    0 (13)
HA :   > 0 (14)
In words, we want to know whether the probability of being in the near compliant region
rose in the after period, relative to before the law was in place.
We can also extend the test to a framework that includes a measure of the intensity of the
law. Suppose that wages are given by wi = 0 + t1 + WGj2 + WGjt3 + i, where WGj is the
median wage gap for domestic workers in the local labor market during the period before the law.




= ( 1   WGjt3)[(2   0   t1)   (1   0   t1)] (15)
Our test will involve examining the signs and signicance of the marginal eect of t, at
the mean level of the pre-law wage gap.Appendix 2 Figure 1: Shift in observable characteristics of urban domestic workers
Kernel density plot of predicted propensity scores from a probit of whether the individual is observed in the pre- or POST periods. The
probit regression includes controls for age, age-squared, an African indicator, years of education, nine province dummies and the sample
used in the regression is restricted to all domestic workers in urban areas who appear in ve LFS waves from September 2001 to March
2004. All density estimates use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth selector one-quarter the size of Stata's `optimal' bandwidth
which is the width that minimizes the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were used. Sample
sizes for the pre- and POST periods are 3,947 and 3,349 respectively.Appendix 2 Figure 2: Wage distributions reweighted for  in observable characteristics
Kernel density graph of log real wage distributions for domestic workers pre- and post-law. The gure shows wage distributions in the
pre-period, in the post-period, and in the pre-period re-weighted to force the distribution of observable characteristics in the pre-period
to look like the distribution in the post-period (i.e. adjusting for the change in the distribution of observables: age, age-squared, African,
years of education and province). All density estimates use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth selector one-half the size of Stata's
`optimal' bandwidth which is the width that minimizes the mean integrated squared error if the data were Gaussian and a Gaussian
kernel were used. Sample sizes for the pre- and POST periods are 3,947 and 3,349 respectively.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST 0.198*** 0.188*** 0.194*** 0.183*** 0.209*** 0.197*** 0.209*** 0.197***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) -0.829*** -0.808*** -0.808*** -0.787*** -0.874*** -0.850*** -0.848*** -0.822***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST 0.109*** 0.111*** 0.102 0.103* 0.154*** 0.157*** 0.142** 0.147**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N N
N 6,154 6,154 18 18 5,205 5,205 18 18
Outcome is the log of hourly wages, computed by taking monthly earnings and dividing by usual number of hours worked per week.
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Appendix 3 Table 1: Log hourly wages of domestic workers: Difference-in-differences, unweighted
Robust standard errors presented in each column. In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, standard errors are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, p<0.05** or 
p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance for two-step estimates are taken from the t-distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample in columns 1-4 include 
domestic workers in all waves; sample in columns 5-8 exclude domestic workers in the September 2002 "cusp" wave. 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and median wage is 
the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
OLS OLS Two-step estimator
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
Two-step estimator(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POST -0.512 -0.446 -0.557 -0.471 -0.798 -0.664 -0.622 -0.516
(0.62) (0.59) (1.73) (1.54) (0.88) (0.82) (1.75) (1.54)
Pre-law wage gap (WG) 5.208 4.084 5.990** 5.219* 5.641 4.426 6.810** 5.910**
(3.03) (2.46) (2.76) (2.44) (3.52) (2.77) (3.06) (2.66)
Pre-law wage gap (WG)*POST -2.695 -3.064* -3.509 -3.636 -3.129 -3.536 -4.329 -4.42
(1.58) (1.59) (4.10) (3.77) (2.25) (2.15) (4.31) (3.91)
Controls for age, education, 
African?
N Y N Y N Y N Y
N 6,876 6,876 18 18 5,824 5,824 18 18
Outcome is usual number of hours worked per week.
POST=1 in March 2003, September 2003 and March 2004; otherwise zero.
Robust standard errors presented in each column. In columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, standard errors are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. Significance at p<0.001***, 
p<0.05** or p<0.01* level. Critical values for significance for two-step estimates are taken from the t-distribution (9-4=5 degrees of freedom). See text for details. Sample in 
columns 1-4 include domestic workers in all waves; sample in columns 5-8 exclude domestic workers in the September 2002 "cusp" wave. 
Pre-law wage gap is the province-level difference in the log(median wage)-log(4.1), where 4.1 is the urban full-time minimum wage introduced in November 2002 and 
median wage is the median wage of domestic workers in each province across all of the pre-waves (September 2001 and March 2002).
Appendix 3 Table 2: Usual weekly hours of work of domestic workers: Difference-in-differences, unweighted
All waves Excluding "cusp" wave
OLS Two-step estimator OLS Two-step estimatorThe Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) conducts research 
directed at improving the well-being of South Africa’s poor. It was established in 1975. Over 
the next two decades the unit’s research played a central role in documenting the human 
costs of apartheid. Key projects from this period included the Farm Labour Conference 
(1976), the Economics of Health Care Conference (1978), and the Second Carnegie Enquiry 
into Poverty and Development in South Africa (1983-86). At the urging of the African Na-
tional Congress, from 1992-1994 SALDRU and the World Bank coordinated the Project for 
Statistics on Living Standards and Development (PSLSD). This project provide baseline data 
for the implementation of post-apartheid socio-economic policies through South Africa’s first 
non-racial national sample survey. 
 
In the post-apartheid period, SALDRU has continued to gather data and conduct research 
directed at informing and assessing anti-poverty policy.   In line with its historical contribution, 
SALDRU’s researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-
being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor.  Current 
research work falls into the following research themes:  post-apartheid poverty; employment 
and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; public 
works and public infrastructure programmes, financial strategies of the poor; common prop-
erty resources and the poor.  Key survey projects include the Langeberg Integrated Family 
Survey (1999), the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000), the ongoing Cape Area Panel 
Study (2001-) and the Financial Diaries Project. 
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